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Capital Openness and Income Inequality:
Smooth Sailing or Troubled Waters? 
GUILLERMO LAGARDA, JENNIFER LINARES,  AND KEVIN P.  GALLAGHER
ABSTRACT
The 2008 Financial Crisis and subsequent financial turbulence has triggered economists and 
policymakers to revisit the extent to which capital account liberalization is optimal for all countries at 
all levels of development. While that literature has largely concluded that capital account liberalization 
may have detrimental effects on growth and accentuate financial instability in emerging markets, 
relatively little literature has examined the impacts of capital account liberalization on inequality—a 
subject that has also been under intense study over the past decade as well. In this paper, we attempt 
to build upon and bridge these two literatures to examine the extent to which capital account 
liberalization is associated with income inequality in emerging market and developing countries. 
We confirm earlier studies that show there is such a relationship between increased capital account 
openness and increases in inequality, and that capital account regulations are associated with less 
inequality—at least for emerging market economies. We expand on these findings to learn that 
there are differential impacts of capital account liberalization on inequality during booms and busts, 
being financial development a key factor. During normal times we find thatthere are positive impacts 
on income inequality, whereas during busts capital account liberalization appears to exacerbate 
inequality, calling for active policies.
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21    Introduction
Capital openness has long been associated with financial and banking crises. Most recently, the 
financial crisis raised concerns among policymakers about the effects of capital openness and 
the growing income inequality within countries.  This reaction is not baseless: Over the past 
three decades, increases in financial liberalization and economic downturns have coincided with 
income inequality aggravation. In response, there has been an increase in capital controls and the 
re-regulation of the financial account.1 This return to orthodoxy could be a setback for supporters 
of global coordination.
The troubling decision of choosing sides between closing rather than opening has not been 
exclusive of policymakers. Capital controls are making an intellectual comeback, too: “The 
general presumption was that capital account liberalization was always good, and capital 
controls were nearly always bad.  I’ve seen the thinking change, partly because it was already 
wrong then, and because it was particularly wrong in the crisis,” said Olivier Blanchard, former 
professor of The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and former Chief Economist of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). As Blanchard said, openness has traditionally been seen as 
pareto improving since it expands possibility frontiers. In contrast, closing or restricting the capital 
account is considered by many to be detrimental to countries’ economies. It can, for instance, 
discourage inward investment, as investors may fear they will not be able to easily withdraw their 
money during an economic downturn.
But is capital account liberalization the way to go?  Claimants of openness have long argued 
that it increases risk- sharing and domestic consumption smoothing.  However, when financial 
institutions are weak and access to credit is not inclusive, liberalization may bias financial access 
in favor of those better off and therefore increase income inequality.  It could go the other way 
as well: on the likelihood of financial crises, income inequality could fall as bankruptcies and 
falling asset prices may have a greater impact on those with access to financial markets. On the 
other hand, long-lasting recessions may disproportionately hurt the poor as they have limited 
access to banking services to hedge against risks. Finally, capital account openness may affect the 
distribution of income through its effect on the labor share of income. The best way to think of this 
is in the context of a bargaining game between labor and capital. If capital account liberalization 
represents a credible threat to reallocate production abroad, it may lead to an increase in the profit-
wage ratio and to a decrease in the labor share of income.2
Should we shift gears and revert capital openness? A surge of discussions addressing this question 
suggests that this issue is far from being a closed or even a cold case.  Most of the available 
literature focuses on within- country experience3 or on a limited set of countries4 , thus leaving key 
issues unaddressed. Important questions remain, including:  under what circumstances is capital 
openness negatively related with income inequality, or if there is evidence that capital account 
openness only exacerbates income inequality during downturns and improves it during economic 
expansion? Ultimately we would like to answer if there is a right moment to restrict the capital 
1 The concept of capital flow liberalization is used in this paper interchangeably with capital account liberalization and financial 
account liberalization.
2 Harrion et al. (2002)
3 Larrain (2014)
4 Das and Mohapatra (2003)
3account during contractions and if these measures should be coordinated worldwide.
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on the effects of capital openness on income 
inequality by examining the distributional consequences of capital account liberalization for a 
large (unbalanced) panel of 141 countries from 1990 to 2013.  We specifically focus on answering 
three questions:  i) Is there (on average) a positive or negative relation between income inequality 
and capital account openness? ii) Are the negative effects of income distribution larger during 
booms, busts and/or regular periods? iii) Have ex-ante and ex-post capital openness policies 
contributed to reduce income inequality?  To the best of our knowledge, there is still no research 
document covering these issues. Therefore, our research contributes to the literature and brings to 
consideration if capital account liberalization occurred too rapidly relative to the implementation 
of other policies.
We find that the level of financial development and the occurrence of crises play a key role in 
shaping the incidence that financial globalization reforms have on income inequality. In particular, 
we present evidence that capital account liberalization reforms are associated with a statistically 
significant and persistent increase in income inequality ex post a crisis. However, results also suggest 
that restrictive measures aimed at limiting distributional negative effects during economic downturns 
have ambiguous outcomes and are conditional on the duration of the bust. Closing the accounts 
ex post, for instance, reduces the Gini by 0.02 but only when the downturn lasts more than a year. 
Otherwise, when the bust is gone after a year, the policy changes are ineffective as the pace at 
which they actually impact the economy is slower. The increase of income inequality is, however, 
conditional on the structural policies that accompanied liberalization reforms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a summary of the related 
literature. Section 3 focuses on describing data and showing some descriptive statistics regarding 
the evolution of inequality and capital account openness. Section 4 specifies the methodology and 
is followed by a discussion of results in Section 5. Finally, in chapter 6 we present our conclusions.
2 Related Literature
In the last 25 years, over a dozen countries in the developing world have eased restrictions on 
cross-border capital flows, resulting in a more financially-integrated world.  Theory suggests 
that these policies are Pareto-optimal, as they allow for resources to flow from capital-abundant 
countries in the developed world, where return to capital is low, to capital-scarce nations in 
the developing world, where these are higher.5 This influx of capital to the developing world 
reduces the countries’ cost of capital and consequently encourages investment, ceteris paribus. 
Investment triggers economic growth and therefore raises the standard of living of these countries.  
However, as explained in the theoretical report elaborated by Hellmann et al. (2000), financial 
market liberalization could increase the moral hazard problem: liberalization is associated with 
an increase in bank competition, which in turn erodes profits. A decrease in profits is associated 
with lower franchise values, which lower the incentive of making good loans, thus increasing 
moral hazard. A similar case of information asymmetries is presented in McKinnon and Pill 
(1996). Even Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) show limited benefits of transitioning from an 
5  Henry (2006)
4autarkic state to an open economy, with regards to improvements in domestic productivity.  Thus, 
theory does not conclude whether capital account liberalization is ultimately beneficial or not.
This ambiguity is also found in empirical studies. A variety of studies, including Quinn and Toyoda 
(2008), Arteta et al. (2001)6 , and Henry (2006)), find a positive relationship between financial 
openness and economic growth. Similarly, Ferreira and Laux (2009), using a panel of 50 countries 
from 1988 to 2001, find a positive relationship between portfolio investment and growth in both 
developed and emerging economies.  Moreover, Henry (2003) explores 18 episodes of equity 
market liberalization and finds benefits reflected in the cost of capital, accumulation of capital stock, 
and output growth per worker. However, several other studies suggest that liberalization may not 
be beneficial to all economies, especially those where institutions and macroeconomic policies 
are not strong enough. This was the case for some countries with “premature” liberalization, such 
as Mexico in the mid-1990s and several Asian economies in the late 1990s (Glick et al. (2006)), 
which, after a period of foreign direct investment and portfolio investment bliss, experienced 
massive capital outflows.
Financial openness has also been detrimental in countries with distorted domestic markets, as 
domestic resources are concentrated in less efficient sectors.7 In other instances, liberalization has 
resulted in a minimal increase in inflows, as the case of some African countries8 . This is not the case 
for developed economies, as evidenced by Klein and Olivei (2008), who find a significant positive 
effect between financial liberalization, financial depth and growth in OECD countries.  Further, 
Prasad and Rajan (2008) mention that there may even be a threshold of institutional development 
where liberalization costs outweigh the benefits, or that collateral benefits of liberalization are 
greater at higher levels of development.
In addition to institutional development and financial depth, timing has also been identified as an 
important factor in determining if liberalization will be beneficial. Reinhart and Reinhart (2008), 
using a panel of 181 countries for the period 1960 to 2007, concluded that periods of high 
capital flows result in a greater likelihood of subsequent financial and economic crises. Further, 
Bussiere and Fratzscher (2008), using a panel of 45 advanced and emerging economies found 
short-term positive causality between liberalization and economic growth, but low significance in 
the long-term. Furceri (2015) also explores the timing factor by using an exogenous monetary 
shock. His results suggest that the largest increases in income inequality occurred in countries 
with weaker financial institutions and when followed by financial crises. Atkinson and Morelli 
(2011) also sought to quantify the changes in income distribution during atypical periods-crises. 
However, unlike this paper and that of Furceri (2015), they did not control for financial openness. 
They conclude that there are no consistent patterns within the sample. This is because a crisis can 
encourage the creation of policies that permanently change the level of income inequality, such as 
the creation of the Social Security program in the United States after the 1929 depression.
Timing requires planning: Arora et al. (2013), Gallagher et al. (2012), and Helleiner (2011) all 
discuss the role of international coordination and global governance. Their common denominator 
is that capital openness requires comprehensive planning. Liberalization polices should be timed 
6  However, the effects vary with time. We elaborate on the importance of timing later in this section
7 Wang (2002)
8  Kose and Prasad (2012)
5and sequenced to ensure that their benefits outweigh their costs. Contrary to other academic 
research, they consider that financial liberalization policies should be designed as a function of 
both domestic and multilateral effects. Appropriate policy responses comprise a range of measures 
and involve, both, countries that are senders and recipients of capital flows.
A less researched topic is the relationship between financial liberalization and income inequality, 
yet the available literature has also found mixed results. Agnello et al. (2012), using a panel 
of 62 countries for 1973-2005, find that certain financial liberalization reforms, including the 
elimination of policies towards directed credit and high reserve requirements helps in the reduction 
of inequality at the low-end of the income distribution.  Claessens and Perotti (2007) explore 
how political influence encourages liberalization reforms that improve the financial access of 
the elite. This induces inequality because the benefits of openness are absorbed by the elites while 
risks are assimilated by the rest of the population.  The authors concluded that financial reforms 
are only beneficial when accompanied by supervisory institutions. Similarly, (and incorporating 
some of the elements on financial depth discussed above) Bumann and Lensink (2016) develop 
a theoretical model of the banking sector and explore two types of countries: one with more 
financial depth than the other. Liberalization reduces credit costs, driving demand for loans and 
raising interest rates to attract savings deposits. This improves income distribution. Empirically, 
the authors prove that the direct relationship between openness and inequality is positive, but that 
it is subject to financial depth. This finding may explain why Ang (2010) found that financial 
liberalization is associated with an increase in inequality in India. 
Delis et al. (2013) explore the relationship between liberalizing banking systems and income 
inequality, and find that the former is associated with a significant decrease of the latter (represented 
by both the Theil index and the Gini coefficient), yet that the effect varies across countries and 
liberalization policies. The effect is not significant in countries with low levels of economic and 
institutional development, and market-based economies (as opposed to bank-based economies). 
Further, the policies that narrow income inequality the most include the abolishment of credit 
controls (in the long term), and interest rate controls and tighter banking supervision (in the short 
term). 
A persistent finding in most of the aforementioned studies is that effects vary across countries 
given their income levels or institutional development. We therefore include dummy variables 
by income groups in our model. In addition, we add other indicators that may have an effect on 
income inequality, as identified by the literature. These include monetary shocks (Furceri 2015), 
trade (Jaumotte et al. 2008, more), and skilled labor (Larrain 2014). Further, we explore atypical 
economic events (i.e., the timing factor). This allows us to confirm if capital account liberalization 
is beneficial in absence of an atypical economic cycle. This method is different from Bumman 
and Lensink’s, who do not account for economic booms or busts. As for coordination, our research 
does not test hypotheses on the degree of financial linkages within countries or discuss the direct 
effects of international assistance by multilaterals. However, our findings encourage the request 
for better coordination that may help minimize the detrimental effects on income distribution that 
greater financial openness may bring. Finally, in the case of labor market elements mentioned in 
Larrain (2014)), we do not include correlations between financial liberalization and increases in 
skilled labor (or relative wages); at least not explicitly. However, we include in our estimations 
schooling and trade openness to account for wage-skill differentials.
63    Measures and Correlations
Income Inequality
The Gini coefficient is the most widely used measure of income inequality. The Standardized 
World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) (Solt (2014)) contains post-tax income estimates 
represented in 100 separate imputations per country. For simplification purposes, we averaged the 
100 imputations for each country, per year. Figure 1a shows time series for seven world regions. 
Income inequality has increased in most countries, especially in the developed economies. 
Interestingly though, in Latin America, the most unequal region of the world, income distribution 
seems to be improving, even after the late 90s when the large countries in the region experienced 
slowdowns. Figure 1b shows all countries divided by income groups. Once again, high-income 
countries seem to have the worst trend. This in part could be associated with the 2008-09 crisis, 
given that these countries are very open to the global economy.  Low-income countries seem to 
be the least affected, possibly because of the countries’ fewer linkages with the global economy.
Figure 1: Inequality Measured by Gini Coefficient
Capital Account Liberalization
Capital Account liberalization de jure measures are typically constructed from the IMF’s Annual 
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER), which measures over 
60 different types of controls. Measures typically result in binary variables where 1 equals the 
presence of financial controls, and 0 otherwise. One such de jure measure is the Chinn-Ito index, 
which has been fine-tuned for the extent of openness in capital account transactions.9
It does not, however, measure the intensity of capital controls as Quinn (1997) and Quinn (2003) 
do. Chinn-Ito’s correlation with Quinn, though, is 0.84, suggesting that it captures capital control 
intensity to a reasonable extent.
Fernandez et al. (2015) recently developed a de jure dataset (KA-Uribe hereafter) using AREAER 
9  Chinn and Ito (2008) argue that this index could be used as a proxy for strength of capital controls. 
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7and the methodology in Schindler (2009). The dataset offers information on capital controls 
that are disaggregated both by type (i.e. whether the controls are on inflows or outflows), and 
by 10 different categories of assets, including money market instruments; derivatives; collective 
investment securities; guarantees, sureties, and financial back-up facilities; and direct investment 
accounts. KA-Uribe construct an index from these data that ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 is equivalent 
to a capital account lacking restrictions, while 1 is equivalent to a fully “closed” account. The 
correlation between KA-Uribe and the Chinn-Ito index stands strong at -0.87. It is important 
to recall that it is normal that the Chinn-Ito index and KA-Uribe move in opposite directions, 
because in the former, the maximum value is equivalent to a fully liberalized account, while in 
the latter, the maximum value is equivalent to a fully restricted account.
Several de facto measures have also been generated in response to de jure measures’ shortcomings. 
Lane and Milesi- Ferretti (2007), proposed a stock-based de facto database that captures a country’s 
exposure to international financial markets.  It includes countries’ aggregate assets and liabilities 
in the following categories: portfolio equity, foreign direct investment, debt, and financial 
derivatives. For this paper, we summed all portfolio investment and debt assets and liabilities10 , as 
a percentage of GDP. The resulting “index” was used as a de facto measure. It should be noted that 
gross capital flows are more volatile than equity based measures (Quinn et al. (2011)).
11
For our empirical analysis, we considered both de jure and de facto measures, as many countries 
legally allow capital account transactions but do not receive flows.12  Only a handful of countries 
with liberalized capital accounts receive a high percentage of capital flows. Therefore, utilizing 
only de jure measures could bias results. Similarly, omitting variables that explain the difference 
between the degree of de jure and de facto liberalization could cause heterogeneity issues if we only 
use de facto measures.  To reduce the possibility of omitting these variables, we used additional 
controls, including depth of financial system (i.e.: C redit to private sector as a percentage of 
GDP) and institution strength.
It should be noted that having a closed capital account does not guarantee a lack of investment 
flows into a country either. For instance, direct investment and funds recorded as “other investment” 
in the balance of payments can enter a country through the banking system or any other means 
offered by the central bank. However, this research focuses on portfolio investment flows. It 
would be unlikely to find a situation where portfolio investment enters a country without a de jure 
framework that allows for it.
Relationship between Financial Liberalization and Income Inequality
A quick glance at our panel shows that the Chinn-Ito and the Gini coefficient are negatively 
correlated. In other words: the opening of the capital account is associated with a reduction in 
income inequality. However, this correlation is rather weak (-0.15). The effect of openness is also 
beneficial (but weaker) when comparing the Fernandez-Uribe index to the Gini coefficient. As 
mentioned above, considering only de jure measures can provide an inaccurate picture of reality.
Therefore, we also evaluated the relationship between capital flows (as a percentage of GDP) from 
10 Flows
11 These measures usually suffer from endogeneity and may not reflect changes induced by policies.
12 A scatterplot of Chinn-Ito vs. a de facto measure (see figure 2) shown in the Annex provides evidence for this argument.
8the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti database and the Gini index. The result (-0.07), although very weak, 
also suggests that a greater amount of capital flows is associated with a fall in income inequality.
These correlations contrast with the econometric findings in the literature - a proof that the effects 
of financial openness on inequality are not uniform across countries. There is clearly more to 
explore than just a simple correlation. Some of the reasons for this contrasting effects discussed in 
the literature include political, institutional and market efficiency differences. While the reasons 
are many, researchers seem to agree on the role of institutions, as countries with solid institutions 
usually have a higher penetration of financial services.  To control for institutions, we assume that 
the degree of institutional strength is correlated with GDP per capita.  
Thus, we classified countries into three income groups: high income, middle income and low 
income based on the following rule
13 :
Correlations by income group, although generally weak, vary significantly. For instance: while 
the correlation be- tween the Chinn-Ito index and Gini is negative for the entire panel, it is 
positive (although weak) for the low and middle income groups, implying that only high income 
groups have benefited (in terms of inequality reduction) from liberalizing their capital account.
In addition to income groups, we further disaggregated the panel into three periods that we 
consider fundamentally different from each other: 1990-1999; 2000-2007; and 2008-2013. 
Between 1990 and 1999, more than 80 countries opened their capital accounts. However, it was 
actually starting in 2000 that de facto openness accelerated. Finally, 2008 marks the beginning of 
the Great Recession.14 This additional disaggregation allowed us to visualize whether there were 
characteristics between income groups and over time that contrast the aforementioned correlations.
Correlations by time period also show inconsistent results: for the high-income group, the 
relationship between capital account liberalization (using Chinn-Ito) and income inequality is 
unfavorable during most periods15 :  that is, that capital account liberalization is associated with 
an increase in income inequality. The correlations are even stronger when using the Fernandez-
Uribe index. We run a final check by exploring the relationship between Gini and the lags of each of 
the de jure measures, given that the Gini coefficient usually reports the previous year’s inequality. 
However, correlations remain virtually identical to those found with their contemporary values.
We also explored the relationship between our de facto measure and income inequality by 
income groups. For these correlations, we used the lag of the de facto measure, for reasons 
mentioned above.  The results are ambiguous: liberalization is usually unfavorable for low and 
middle income countries16 , but is beneficial to high-income countries. This correlation, along with 
13  We used GDP per capita, PPP, and constant 2011 international dollars from the World Bank.
14  According to the U.S. NBER, the great recession started in December 2007. Given that the panel contains annual data, we 
marked 2008 as the start of the recession
15  Except for the low and middle income groups during 1990-1999, where the relationship is practically inexistent
16  Except for middle-income countries from 2008-2013.
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼	𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺1 =
𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 < 4,999
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 5000 ≤ 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 ≤ 19,999
𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻ℎ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 > 20,000
	
																																																						
1 The rule above allowed us to account for countries’ transitions between groups throughout time. For a detailed list of countries by income 
group, please see the Annex 
9the correlations mentioned above, are consistent with the arguments of Klein and Olivei (2008) 
and Prasad and Rajan (2008) on the importance of the strength of institutions for a beneficial 
reception of capital flows.
Relevant Shocks
The academic literature has identified several shocks that may have an effect on the reduction 
of income inequality. For purposes of our study, we focused on impacts that are transmitted 
through portfolio investment. Monetary policy in particular (Coibion et al. (2012)), can have 
global effects that are reflected in the cost of capital. An exogenous shock that suddenly increases 
liquidity and persistently maintains low rates can generate changes in investment patterns. In 
this case, income inequality could improve or worsen, depending on the sector of the economy 
that absorbs the benefits. The reasoning behind this is that most households primarily rely on 
labor earnings instead of business and financial income: if expansionary monetary policy shocks 
raise profits more than wages, then those with claims to ownership of firms will tend to benefit 
disproportionately. Since these people also tend to be wealthier, this channel should lead to higher 
income inequality in response to monetary policy shocks. Also, if some agents  frequently trade 
in financial markets and are affected by changes in the money supply prior to other agents, then 
an increase in the money supply will redistribute wealth toward those agents most connected to 
financial markets.
Another variety of shocks could be related to internal conditions that suddenly change from 
optimistic to pessimistic, such as the difference between growth expectations and the actual 
GDP growth rate. Although there is usually much correlation between this variable and other 
factors, and while this variable is not the best representation of a domestic shock, it allows for the 
estimation of an orthogonal component to external factors. In addition, this difference between 
expectations and reality may be interacting with the capital account liberalization policy or with 
de facto capital flows. Finally, including this variable into our analysis could be interesting as it 
allows us to see the effect that an underperforming economy17 has on income distribution during 
periods of capital account liberalization.
We thus control for these two types of shocks by including the following variables 
into our analysis:
• Romer and Romer (2004) (hereinafter RR) shocks, which reflect changes in U.S. monetary 
policy (agreed at each Federal Open Market Committee meeting) which are orthogonal to 
the set of information from the Fed, obtained from the GREENBOOK forecasts. This 
variable can be used to identify monetary policy innovations purged from anticipated effects 
related to economic conditions.
• To characterize unusual economic episodes we generated a proxy variable that is only 
weakly correlated with world economic performance. To do so we used the real GDP 
growth rate of each country and projected to current and lagged GDP growth of U.S., 
Japan, Germany, and China18  both lagged and contemporaneous.  The estimation results 
are then used to find the forecast error the proxy we seek.
17  That is, performing slower than expected
18  China’s GDP and lagged GDP is only included from 2004-on
10
• We also used a simple categorization of GDP growth performance: regular episode 
whenever GDP growth is within a 1.5 (historical) standard deviation, boom when it is 
above, and bust when it is below.
4    Methodology
We first performed a baseline estimation that inherits some elements from Bumann and Lensink 
(2016) as well as Furceri (2015).  We then improved the baseline estimations by adding variables 
that we believe are useful in the identification of unusual economic episodes. Doing so allowed 
for a better understanding of correlations and helped identify the direction of causality between 
capital account openness and income inequality over different time periods. We focus on answering 
three questions: i) If, on average, there is a positive or negative relation between income in- 
equality and capital account openness; ii) whether the negative effects of income distribution are 
larger during booms and/or busts, and iii) if ex-ante and ex-post capital openness policies have 
contributed to reduce income inequality.
To address the above, we begin describing the general 
econometric model:
                                               (1)
In this equation,  and  are indices for country and time, respectively. Our measure for income 
inequality  is expressed in natural logarithms.19  are country fixed effects. We included the lag 
of the Gini coefficient as explanatory variable to account for the persistence of inequality that is 
observed in the data. KAOP corresponds to the capital openness indicator and  is the error term. 
Our hypothesis here is that on average, for the entire sample,  with some good level of significance. 
We believe this should be the case since capital openness has been widespread, suggesting that 
policy makers at least perceive that open policies are contributing to improving inequality. 
However, given that the literature indicates that institutions play a key role on the distribution of 
benefits, we expand the basic regression to quantify if there is a significant different level effect 
between countries with strong, medium and weaker institutions. To do so we include a full set 
of dummies to identify if a country is a high, medium, or low-income group. Furthermore, we 
add other controls that may help better identify the correlation between capital openness and 
inequality. 
                         (2)
where  are j-dummies variables income groups per each i countries.  is a set of j-variables usually 
19  We follow Furceri (2015), using the logarithm of the Gini index as it makes it behave more like a normally distributed vari-
able and thus more amenable for an OLS estimation
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈	𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸 =
𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 < 𝜇𝜇6 − 1.5𝜎𝜎6
𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜇𝜇6 − 1.5𝜎𝜎6 ≤ 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 ≤ 𝜇𝜇6 + 1.5𝜎𝜎6
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 > 𝜇𝜇6 − 1.5𝜎𝜎6
	
𝑔𝑔",$ = 𝑐𝑐 + 𝜑𝜑" + 𝜌𝜌𝑔𝑔",$*+ + 𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾",$ + 𝜀𝜀",$.	
𝑔𝑔",$ = 𝑐𝑐 + 𝜑𝜑" + 𝜌𝜌𝑔𝑔",$*+ + 𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾",$ + 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷",3
3
+ 𝛾𝛾𝑥𝑥",3,$
3
+ 𝜀𝜀",$,	
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associated with inequality changes.   includes inflation, financial depth, trade openness, age 
dependency ratio and secondary education enrollment as control variables. Academic research 
has identified these variables as key correlates of income equality. Some of the arguments are 
listed as follow20: 
1. Low-income households normally keep a large percentage of their income in cash to 
buy goods.  Thus, they are more likely to be affected by a generalized increase of prices.21  
However, the effect of price level changes on income inequality might be conditional on the 
capacity of household to shield against them, (through the banking system, for instance).  
Therefore, we add credit to the private sector as percent of GDP as a measure of financial 
depth.
2. Trade openness might also be a channel inducing income inequality, as trade flows could 
cause sudden changes in the relative demand of high skilled workers. In the absence of 
migration policies or an adequate education system, these trade flows could cause a rise of 
relative wages thus increasing income inequality.22
3. Education deficiencies may also induce income inequality as education levels could create   
     wage differentials.23
4. A country’s age structure may also have an effect on income inequality. For instance, 
inequality could be lower among retirees (but so is their average income).24
Unlike Bumann and Lensink (2016), we did not include GDP per capita as a proxy for development 
of institutions. Instead, we grouped the countries by income level, as explained in the previous 
chapter. This allows us to indirectly control for institutions without having to regress on one 
additional variable.
To address question ii), we follow two approaches. The first one simply based on the link 
between higher RR values and an unusual episode, which surprises the world economy as a 
whole. To briefly recapitulate, RR is large when the increase of interest rates is higher than the 
expected.  Recall that RR constructs this variable in such a way that is strongly exogenous to 
other macroeconomic variables. Therefore, RR acts as a shock that may help determine a causal 
relation between a boom or bust episode and the changes in inequality.  We use this event to 
contrast the coefficients for KAOP. We hypothesize that given a more than expected decrease 
of the interest rate (worse economic conditions than expected) . The rationale behind this is that 
when countries are caught in an unexpectedly worse economic condition, low-income households 
are unable to adjust their spending fast enough and lack the financial instruments to mitigate 
the downturn, reducing the beneficial multiplier of KAOP.  A second estimation to account for 
economic conditions considers a simple categorization of GDP growth performance based on the 
categories of unusual events previously defined. We do not have a prior or a particular position 
here. However, we seek to answer if on average KAOP has led to larger inequality during busts 
compared to booms.
20  Bumman and Lensink (2016) include a complete discussion on the selection of these variables. 
21  Albanesi (2007)
22  Anderson (2005)
23  Goldin and Katz (2007)
24  Alesina and Perotti (1996)
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Finally, to investigate if ex-ante and ex-post capital openness policies have contributed to 
reduce income inequality (question iii), we categorized the magnitude of changes in our capital 
openness variable.  First, we defined that a liberalization policy occurred whenever there was 
a positive change on KAOP between t −1 and t.  Otherwise, the policy remained unchanged 
(“none”) or had a negative change (“close”):
We then use these variables to answer if income distribution improves. A key element here is 
that policies on capital account openness are typically non-linear. For instance, it is likely that a 
decision of adding capital controls occur during a bust or a moment when economic conditions 
might induce capital flights. Therefore, we modify equation (1) to add these features:
                       (3)
where  are j-dummies variables for Policy groups per each i country.  is a set of j-variables 
usually associated with inequality changes and  includes a 1 and those variables that denote a 
macroeconomic shock. It is worth noting that KAOP is omitted from equation (3) given that the 
objective is to assess restrictive policies. 
                                                                         
5    Results and Discussion
Capital Account Liberalization and Income Inequality
The initial hypothesis –whether capital openness is correlated with lesser inequality- in the full 
sample regression largely holds. On average, we find that for every unit of capital liberalization 
the Gini coefficient falls about 2.3% with 99% of confidence. This result broadly confirms the 
trends we have seen in the data: since 1990’s countries across the globe have liberalized their 
capital account to some degree, potentially after observing success stories elsewhere. The sign of 
this estimation seems also consistent with other recent studies as Furceri (2015). 
Surely, this is not the whole story. Figure 1 showed that while some income groups had improved 
in terms of reducing inequality, high-income countries had seen a steady increase on inequality 
that has only ceded recently. How is this possible? Gini estimates usually are sensitive to the 
measure of income or wealth that is taken into considerations. However, an increase of the mass of 
people in the lowest income percentiles will impact the Gini calculation, for instance, because of 
low-skill migration. Nonetheless, we hypothesize that strong institutions should, or at least could, 
explain the positive correlation between financial liberalization and the inequality reduction. 
Under this hypothesis, stronger institutions suppose a better governance environment that could 
lead to more inclusive policies. Thus, we test for a negative correlation between inequality and 
capital openness (KAOP) differentiating income groups. In other words, the direct effect of 
KAOP on the Gini should be stronger as countries gain stronger institutions. Columns (2) -(4) 
𝐸𝐸 𝑔𝑔#,%|𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑔𝑔 − 𝐸𝐸 𝑔𝑔#,%|𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑘𝑘 = [𝛽𝛽 8 − 𝛽𝛽 9 ] + [𝛿𝛿 8 − 𝛿𝛿 9 ]𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾#,%,	
𝑔𝑔",$ = 𝑐𝑐 + 𝜑𝜑" + 𝜌𝜌𝑔𝑔",$*+ + 𝜇𝜇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃",2,$ ∗ 𝑍𝑍",$*+
2
+ 𝛾𝛾𝑥𝑥",2,$
2
+ 𝜀𝜀",$,	
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 =
𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ∆𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑃𝑃0,2 < 0
𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ∆𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑃𝑃0,2 = 0
𝐾𝐾𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ∆𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑃𝑃0,2 > 0
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in Table 1 show different estimations to test the hypothesis. The income group effect is divided 
into two sets: weak institutions (low and middle-income countries) and strong institutions (high-
income countries). In all these estimations, KAOP continues to be negatively correlated with the 
Gini although with slightly lesser impact. Nonetheless, a simple t-test provides evidence of non-
significant difference of the KAOP coefficient between the dummy regression and the baseline 
estimation. These same estimations (column (2)) show us that conditional on being part of the 
group of weak institutions the level impact is positive, that is, on average these countries have 
more inequality – an expected result. 
The estimations in column (3) provide us with a more interesting result. Here we do not use 
single dummies but their interaction with KAOP. Since the previous dummy estimation offered 
no additional information regarding the KAOP coefficient we seek here for a likely slope effect. 
The intuition behind this option is that while it is clear that there is a different level of inequality 
between each group, the way capital account openness has impacted inequality could vary 
according to the degree of openness they each decide to keep. According to the estimations, 
conditional on whether a country has strong or weak institutions, the total accounting of direct 
and indirect effects seems to balance in favor of our hypothesis. In fact, we first note that the 
direct effect – the coefficient of KAOP- reduces the impact level from approximately 2% to 1.6%. 
But the story does not end here. What will determine the final overall effect is whether a country 
has weak or strong institutions. This second component is measured by the interaction term. 
The estimation outcomes suggest that there is certain evidence of differential effects between 
countries with different degrees of institutional strength. Having weak institutions for a certain 
level of capital openness will more likely drive inequality up, though this is only significant at 
10%. Contrastingly, under stronger institutions the coefficient is negative – inequality reducing – 
with larger significance. For completeness of these analysis, the final column in Table 1 combines 
the dummy analysis with the interaction terms. The results are consistent with what we discussed 
here. The dummies, track the same sign as before and the interaction terms follow suit. The direct 
effect of KAOP on Gini growth remains below 2%, the strong institution coefficients remain 
basically unchanged, the weak institution dummy reduced almost half its magnitude, and the 
weak institution interaction term doubled its detrimental effect on inequality growth.
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Table 1. Baseline Regression, Arellano-Bover, All Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gini (t-1) 0.837** 0.829** 0.839** 0.729**
(40.81) (39.13) (38.37) (58.77)
KAOP -0.0230** -0.0209** -0.0162* -0.0178**
(-3.00) (-2.72) (-2.11) (-6.07)
Dummies
     Weak          0.0275**        0.0103+
(2.77) (1.72)
     Strong -0.0195* -0.0134+
(-2.11) (-1.89)
KAOP*Weak    0.0244+      0.0401**
(1.66) (5.99)
KAOP*Strong -0.0227+ -0.0278**
(-1.69) (-6.43)
Constant 0.620** N/A 0.614** N/A
(8.06) (7.52)
Observations 2438 2438 2438 2438
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
It seems reasonable to associate income inequality with institutional strength. The estimations 
in Table 1, seen as snapshot, will be conductive to the common belief that stronger institutions 
will identify and take advantage of the benefits of capital account openness, while weaker 
institutions might not seize the benefits, resulting in more inequality. However, it seems that a 
better interpretation would be linked to answering if transitioning from weak to strong institutions 
is associated with a significant improvement of equality. With the dummy regressions plus 
interaction terms we can answer this question. Because the dummy estimation uses a discrete set 
of binary variables, the only way to evaluate how inequality growth changes as a country moves 
from weak to strong institutions is a simple difference.  We now pay attention to the estimation in 
column (4).  To answer if transitioning to a better income group induces a significantly different 
effect on Gini growth we calculate the following:
     (5)
The above equations divide the total effect of improving institutions into two parts. The first 
component, , quantifies a direct effect of improving institutions. However, the global effect is 
conditional on the degree of capital openness which supposes an indirect effect  Column (4) there 
is a reduction in income inequality when a country strengthens its institutions. However, the effect 
is stronger when coupled with a liberalized capital account.
Another way to think about these correlations is to quantify how the marginal contribution of 
capital openness changes given the strength of institutions. This analysis derives straightforwardly 
from the previous estimations. That is, we are interested in determining the magnitude and size 
for: 
                                                                            (6)
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We once again examine the results shown in column (4) of Table 1. In this case, we see that the 
marginal contribution to the elasticity has different patterns. For instance, conditional on having 
weaker institutions will lead to a positive overall value, thus, implying that capital openness could 
lead to higher inequality. In contrast, the effect when there are strong institutions is completely the 
opposite; the total effect would reduce inequality in 10%.25 Both calculations seem to go in the 
same directions: capital openness seem to be inequality-reducing as institutions are strengthen.
The analysis based on level effect differences by income groups –our proxy for institutional 
strength – gave us some initial thoughts of inequality patterns. The truth is that while institutions 
are key on handling distributional policies, there are multiple factors that are usually correlated 
strongly with inequality growth. Endogeneity may arise when a public policy, say in education, 
gradually has a feedback effect on institutional strength. A likely story here could be that as human 
capital increases, institutions may gain strength and this in turn provides a better machinery to 
implement better policies in education. It would remain unclear if the initial implementation of 
the educational policy would had happened without any previous changes on institutions. This 
sort of ambiguity is a source of endogeneity that would require to be better addressed. Thus, so 
far we can only attest the correlation between changes in inequality and the degree of openness 
unconditional on other latent factors. Previously we discussed the usual variables that literature 
usually links with inequality. These variables speak out about structural features of the economy 
that form part of the way income is distributed within a country. Since we want to isolate as much 
as we can the direct effect of capital openness on inequality we proceed to control for the usual 
variables that literature uses as correlates for inequality. 
Because countries with weak institutions have important differences with those of strong 
institutions we try here a slightly different way to test our hypotheses. We divide the sample into 
two groups, those with weak and strong institutions. This way we proxy per capita income and 
quality of institutions. By doing so we implicitly constrain the distribution of the other factors 
for instance26: i) most of the observations with a private credit ratio below 25 percent come from 
low income and middle income countries; ii) high school enrollment rate is usually below 44 
percent in low income countries, and so on. For each sample we perform a set of estimations 
incrementally adding the structural variables. We then proceed by asking how relevant are these 
variables for countries of weaker institutions? 
The estimations for the weak institutions sample is reported in Table 2. We find that the sign 
of the correlation between inequality and KAOP holds with strong significance in the baseline 
case. Sign and magnitude is similar as in the whole sample baseline. Significance, though, falls 
for some of the subsequent regressions. Table 2 incrementally shows how the main structural 
variables affect the KAOP correlation with inequality. Inflation, while significant at 10% has the 
expected detrimental effect on equality. The KAOP coefficient slightly shifts down compared to 
the baseline. A larger change occurs when we added trade openness. The KAOP coefficient drops 
in absolute value from 0.0243 to 0.0170, about 42%, albeit with much less statistical significance. 
Also important is the fact that the trade coefficient has a negative correlation with inequality. 
As reported in the literature review, the extent to what trade has contributed to a reduction of 
inequality has divided views. Here we find that in this time span and with these combination of 
25  We did not find statistical support for the correlations in low-income countries.
26  Tables 12-15 in the Annex have summary statistic tables per income group
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controls, trade seems to be mostly beneficial in this subsample.  Education also pulls down the 
magnitude of the KAOP’s coefficient. According to the estimation, schooling turns out to be an 
important element for inequality. Schooling has an interesting interpretation. Because increasing 
the average years of schooling is a long term process the sample covering since 1990 can only 
capture few generations of young individuals. In spite of this, we can see the positive effects that 
schooling has through possible salary channels in the non-high income countries.27
So far, all correlates including inflation, trade openness and school enrollment preserve the expected 
sign: inflation associated with inequality growth, trade openness with decrease of inequality, and 
high school enrollment with less inequality. According to these outputs, capital openness-when 
controlling for inflation, age structure, trade openness and secondary enrollment-is associated 
with a 1.2%-2.4% decrease in income inequality. We validate these differences again through a 
test of means between each marginal contributor and the baseline estimation. The differences are 
all statistically significant as can be attested in Table 3.
Table 2. Weak Institutions: Controlled Fixed-Effects Arellano-Bover
   t statistics in parentheses
   + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
When analyzing the strong-institutions set of countries, findings differ from those of weak 
institutions in several ways. First, the baseline estimation for this sample shows a positive 
coefficient for KAOP. This is true for most of the subsequent estimations, though most of them 
with very low significance. This seems to contradict the results obtained with the whole sample, 
but it does not. In our sample, high-income countries reached their highest levels of capital account 
openness in the 90s and since then, they have only experienced increases in inequality whenever 
new countries join this income group. At the same time, inequality has been increasing, passing 
from an average Gini coefficient of 36 in the 90s to nearly 40 in the 2000s. Regardless of this, 
our incremental estimations seem to move KAOP from a positive coefficient to a negative and 
significant one.  
Table 4 shows the estimations for countries with strong institutions. Once again, our structural 
27  While not the core of the discussion here, is important to keep in mind that as countries open to trade, schooling improved. 
This would be compatible with the increasing job opportunities due to trade.
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gini (t-1) 0.849** 0.885** 0.845** 0.743** 0.703** 0.737** 
 (66.39) (68.70) (62.79) (47.10) (48.59) (47.77) 
KAOP -0.0279** -0.0243** -0.00170+ -0.0119 -0.01285+ -0.0147* 
 (-6.19) (-4.80) (-1.32) (-1.02) (-1.22) (-2.20) 
Structural Controls       
       Inflation  0.00140+ 0.00124+ 0.00221 0.00308+ 0.00260+ 
  (1.46) (1.30) (1.28) (1.81) (1.52) 
      TradeOP   -0.0771** -0.0551** -0.0514** -0.0538** 
   (-13.50) (-9.96) (-9.38) (-9.71) 
       Schooling    -0.000271** -0.000360** -0.000329** 
    (-3.06) (-3.94) (-3.58) 
Financial Controls       
       Fin. Depth     -0.00679+ -0.00128 
     (-1.45) (-1.05) 
       KAOP*Fin.Depth      0.0171** 
      (2.70) 
Constant 0.582** 0.442** 0.643** 1.027** 1.006** 1.053** 
 (12.06) (9.14) (12.46) (16.68) (16.90) (16.98) 
Observations 1704 1548 1518 1087 1065 1065 
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correlates keep their signs consistent with most of the literature. But this should not surprise us 
at all. Schooling differentials, increases on price level, or trade openness are usually at desired 
levels throughout the time span of this sample.  Inflation, is positively correlated, as expected, 
although never significant. This is because for these countries, inflation has been relatively steady 
during most of the sample, inducing a low covariance between these two and a resulting low 
t-statistic. Just as with the weak institutions sample, we observe a larger change in the KAOP 
coefficient when we control for trade openness. The KAOP coefficient drops from 0.01 to 0.001, 
albeit with low statistical significance. Trade coefficient has a negative and significant correlation 
with inequality, too. While this is also the case for the weak institutions sample, the magnitude 
is much lower here (in absolute terms). Recall that the point estimate in the weak institution case 
was -0.07, much higher (in absolute terms) than the -0.002 of the high-income countries.28 
Education seems to be a key factor in high-income countries. When we added the high school 
enrollment rate to the estimation, the KAOP coefficient became negative. While the significance 
of the KAOP coefficient is very low, this movement might be telling us that once we account for 
education, then it reveals that capital openness can also have a beneficial effect on equality. Two 
important things should be kept in mind. Increasing the average years of schooling is a long-term 
process and usually these countries already have high schooling indexes. The main beneficiaries 
of schooling are for instance people who migrated from areas with lower schooling, or in the 
case of the European Union, as new countries with lower schooling joined their population may 
have been experiencing a faster catch up. Thus, we can think about the intergenerational positive 
effects that schooling has through possible salary channels for these population groups.
It is worth to point out that KAOP in countries with strong institutions show a persistent lower 
significance. Given that these countries are usually either completely or highly open to capital 
flows (both de jure and de facto) throughout the entire period of study, variation is very limited, 
thus resulting in a weaker relationship between capital account openness and income inequality. 
It is likely that in these countries, other factors such as financial depth have a stronger effect on 
inequality.
Estimations (5) and (6) in Table 2 adds our proxy for financial development to the incremental 
estimations for weak institutions. The first change to note is the increase (in absolute terms) of 
the KAOP estimate. In other words, when controlling for financial development, the correlation 
between capital openness and income inequality becomes stronger in magnitude and significance. 
The level moves from -0.0119 to -0.01285 within a 15% significance. The final estimation 
including the interaction between financial development and KAOP is quite promising. First, 
it induces a more negative coefficient for KAOP and improves the statistical significance of the 
direct effect of financial development. The KAOP point estimates moves from -0.0128 to -0.0147 
with a 95% of confidence. Also, the interaction term has a negative sign, which also means that 
there is an indirect spillover effect from deepening the financial system when the capital account 
is open. The interpretation of the interaction term is straightforward: financial liberalization, when 
accompanied by financial depth, benefits equality as more people has access to mechanisms to 
insure their stream of income and consumption via credit or savings.
28  Once again, this could be related to the fact that these countries usually are more capital intensive and from the perspective of 
the sources of jobs it generates might have a more limited penetration in the lower percentiles. Yet this could be just a possibility 
as trade of labor intensive goods should reduce or maintain certain prices relatively stable, thus potentially helping low income 
households.
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It is worth to expand the discussion of the differences among low-income and middle-income 
countries. Capital openness is again associated with lesser inequality growth after splitting the 
group into low- and middle-income groups.  Yet, our findings suggest that lower income countries 
are associated with lower statistically significant correlations.29 Financial development remains 
a relevant variable to consider in the analysis, and in every case, there is some kind of beneficial 
effect as depth increases. Auxiliary regressions for the low-income group is shown in Table A2 
in the annex. Incremental regressions show evidence of KAOP losing significance in low-income 
countries. However, this fact is not surprising at all. As shown in Figure 2, low income countries, 
regardless of their de jure openness, have very small portfolio flows as a percentage of GDP, which 
also explains the implicit high p-values in the same table. In middle-income countries, capital 
openness improves its significance once we added financial depth and the interaction term.  The 
middle-income countries parameters pool the weak institution ones. For instance, while in the 
low-income group financial depth is not significant, in the middle-income group it is strongly 
significant, thus, leading to a significant outcome in the weak institution estimation.
The high-income economies are typically the most financial integrated and normally more 
financially open. We find that in high-income countries financial development has served as a 
buffer for inequality increases (Table 4). Here the estimations also confirm the beneficial effects 
of a developed financial system. The role of financial depth, measured by credit to the private 
sector as a percentage of GDP is significant, both the linear and the non-linear component. 
The keynote here is the two-piece decomposition of the total effect on income inequality of 
opening the capital account. On the one side, the marginal effect of opening the capital account 
reduces inequality by 0.0105 (KAOP coefficient). On the other, financial depth alleviates even 
further the detrimental effects as indicated by the significant coefficient on the interaction term. 
More precisely, the negative sign implies that the greater the financial depth, the smaller (less 
detrimental) the effect of capital account liberalization on income inequality will be. In fact, both, 
the single effect and the interaction term render a negative coefficient. The power of the estimates 
increases too: both with significance within 1% to 5%. 
The estimations of the financial controls also show key differences between groups of weak and 
strong institutions. Recall that for lower and middles income countries (weak institutions) the 
magnitude of the financial correlates are near -0.0170 for the interaction term and about -0.001 
for the single effect. As Table 4 shows the corresponding estimates are both near -0.0170. The 
fact that the magnitude is similar for the interaction term is simply a sign that the role of a 
deeper financial system in an openness environment is equally beneficial. In contrast the larger 
difference in the single effect simple denotes that a weaker correlation between variations of 
inequality and large changes in financial depth. The higher significance of financial depth in 
Table 4 compared to Table 2 might not be totally unreasonable: in high income countries, while 
there are no meaningful differences in terms of financial development (they all have similar depth 
indicators), they have larger access to banking services for household of all income levels which 
would explain correlations with higher significance.
29  It is important to note that low income countries tend to be less unequal and receive less capital flows relative to other income 
groups.
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Table 4. Strong Institutions: Controlled Fixed-Effects Arellano-Bover
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gini (t-1) 0.852** 0.849** 0.843** 0.811** 0.780** 0.777**
(39.90) (36.58) (27.77) (24.13) (22.33) (22.26)
KAOP 0.0113 0.0101 0.0010 -0.0084 -0.00999 -0.0105*
(1.26) (1.02) (0.82) (-1.06) (1.09) (-1.63)
Structural Controls
      Inflation 0.000326 0.000334 0.000161 0.000106 0.000196
(0.92) (0.94) (0.38) (0.25) (0.46)
      TradeOP -0.00213+ -0.00807* -0.0131+ -0.0149+
(-1.26) (-1.90) (-1.31) (-1.48)
      Schooling -0.00202+ -0.00064+ -0.000968*
(-1.27) (-1.37) (-1.55)
Financial Controls
      Fin. Depth -0.00304 -0.0163*
(-1.02) (-1.62)
      KAOP*Fin.Dept -0.0169*
(-1.78)
Constant 0.533** 0.547** 0.565** 0.709** 0.799** 0.756**
(6.96) (6.53) (5.38) (5.99) (6.55) (6.01)
Observations 734 709 707 635 599 599
 t statistics in parentheses
       + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
While this is a very optimistic result, one could question whether this holds only for those countries 
where households and firms are able to acquire insurance or hedge their savings portfolios during 
downturns. Table A1 shows these same estimations for both, strong and weak institutions groups. 
The results confirm that financial depth is usually beneficial, although with some evidence that in 
weaker institutions countries, where bankarization is lower, this direct effects are not as strong. 
A second way to address this is by using a variable that better describes access to households. 
Financial depth aggregates all credit available to the private sector, but different countries may 
have different rates of access among different income groups within the country. We use as a 
proxy the lending interest rates. The underlying assumption is that typically a country with high 
credit interest rate are either subject to low credit screening or low credit availability, both factors 
linked to the perceived risk by the financial institutions. In this case, lower income households are 
usually the most affected. 
Table A1 show these estimations for weak and strong institutions groups. Weak institutions keep 
magnitude levels that are less than half than those for strong institutions. For instance, level 
impact of or proxy for access is -0.0015 in weak institutions subset, below a -0.0386 of strong 
institutions. Significance differs too. The single effect of our proxy for access while preserves the 
negative sign it is not significant at all. In contrast, the point estimate for strong institutions is 
quite high (1% p value). A similar reasoning applies to the interaction term. Our findings confirm 
the previous argument: in high-income countries financial development seems to be a factor for 
better income distribution while in the opposite group, the correlation is significantly weaker. 
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Timing Matters 
Capital account liberalization policies are aimed at allowing a free flow of financial resources 
in and out of a country. Countries running current account deficits need to find financing for 
all the goods and services they purchase abroad. Whenever direct investment is not enough 
to cover the deficit, capital inflows may find their way in, of course, assuming that the return 
on investment compensates the risk appetite. The previous section shows that as a country 
strengthens its institutions, the benefits of opening the capital account become more apparent. 
Structural conditions like schooling, trade openness or financial depth also play important roles 
in the potential to seize the benefits. If macroeconomic conditions are considered relevant at all, 
a natural question to ask is whether capital openness is beneficial (or detrimental) exclusively 
during episodes of economic expansion (or contraction). This seems a critical question to answer, 
especially as policy makers may be tempted to restrict openness if they believe that it may harm 
the distribution of wealth. Taking as a starting point our previous findings, the main hypothesis 
here is that a deep financial system will allow households of all income levels to insure their 
consumption and income streams, even during sudden busts. However, this has to be contingent 
on the persistence of the poor economic conditions.  
To test our hypothesis, we estimate a parsimonious version of equation (3) that includes the 
Gini lag, the usual controls, capital openness policy changes, and a variable representing cyclical 
behavior of GDP growth. The estimations consider the whole sample and identify via dummies 
episodes for booms and busts. Table 5 shows a sequence of incremental regressions focused on 
booms and busts. Taking as baseline the controlled regression, the indicator variable for booms 
seems to agree with our hypothesis. The coefficient is negative and with a 10% significance.  On 
average, during booms the inequality indicators fall at a rate of 1.93%, coincidentally with a larger 
point estimate for KAOP that increased (in absolute terms) two times more than in the baseline. 
Structural variables see a beneficial effect only in trade openness and no significance on either 
inflation or schooling.  Financial depth continues to be important in explaining the reduction 
of income inequality. In turn, busts seem to lead to important increases of inequality. The point 
estimate for the busts dummy is large: 0.0476. The estimate is only significant at the 15% level, 
and while this is low compared to booms, it’s worth to take into consideration. Consider a scenario 
where the economy slumps into a recession, say for 4 years. On average, the expected inequality 
raise will be of about 5%. To compensate this, we would have to see an enormous increase on 
KAOP or financial access or any of the other structural variables, which is highly unlikely. 
Policy reactions are fundamental to avoid the worsening of income distribution. For a policy to be 
effective, timing and its strength are important features to consider. This reminds us of the steps 
taken by Iceland to control the volatility of flows and massive outflows. Economists use theory 
to characterize the optimality of a policy in terms of time and instrument, but it is only ex-post 
when one can actually test if those policies had the intended effect. In this sense, a policy change 
in response to a “bust” that only persists for a year will not be as effective as a policy change for 
a bust that persists for a longer period. This is simply because implementing a policy takes time 
and the adaptability of agents is not immediate. In fact, in Table 5, estimation (3) includes an 
interaction term of a change in the capital openness policy. The change of policy is a restriction 
on openness measured by a negative change in KAOP compared to the previous year as defined 
in the methodology section. As a reminder, KAOP is not needed as a control because the objective 
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in this group of regressions is to assess restrictive policies. 
The estimation suggests that restricting the capital account during the first year of a bust has no 
beneficial effect on income inequality: in fact, it shows an average increase of about 1% within 
a 90% of confidence. This reflects the previous discussion about timing and the adaptability of 
agents to policy changes. By the time the first year passed, income distribution has already been 
affected (on average). Anticipating the bust, that is, applying a restrictive policy the year before 
the bust (t=-1), on the contrary has a beneficial effect by reducing inequality by about 2% (see 
estimation (4)). The estimation is significant at the 5% level, but is only evidence that countries 
that were already processing changes to restrict openness weathered the bust better than those that 
did not. It does not test if countries that reduced their openness obtain benefits during posterior 
booms. 
Estimation (4) also give us some other insights on why timing matters. Once again, a policy 
change in t=0 registers a correlation with increase of inequality, albeit in a lower magnitude but 
higher significance. The more interesting part results from the interaction between the change 
of policy at t=0 and the periods that the bust lasted. In this case, on average, the point estimate 
suggests a 2% beneficial effect with a 95% confidence, in agreement with our hypothesis. A 
plausible story backing these findings could be that when a policy that restricts capital openness 
is enacted early during the bust, it will meet some of its goals. However, it is unlikely that it will 
avoid distributional effects within a year. Thus, if the same level of restrictions is held in place 
throughout the duration of the bust, then we should expect to observe an average reduction of 
inequality.
Could unexpected shocks magnify through the capital account? It is common to find arguments 
supporting this view. We previously tested for policy reactions to an already unfavorable 
environment, but we have not talked about sudden shocks. The sudden crash in 2008-09 affected 
the most financially integrated economies first. This in part occurred because the crash started in 
the core of the world’s largest financial system. However, contagion entered through the financial 
and monetary channel before affecting the rest of the real economy. It seems like our previous 
estimations gave us a taste of the advantages of deepening the financial system, but the great 
recession suggests otherwise. Where’s the catch? Financial depth variables are usually negatively 
correlated with the Gini, but the post-crisis years only derived into larger inequality in the high-
income economies. Larger economies are typically the most open, but the financial sector could 
not avoid hurting households since the core of the crash was the financial system. Thus, with an ill 
financial system the real economy contraction was faced with limited chances to smooth income 
and consumption. Households, especially lower-income ones, could not react to protect their 
income streams. It is this unexpected component that we hypothesize is behind the steep increases 
of inequality post-crisis.
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Table 5. Booms and Busts: Fixed-Effects Estimations, Arellano-Bover
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gini (t-1) 0.768** 0.769** 0.768** 0.733**
(24.03) (24.00) (23.98) (24.06)
KAOP -0.0135* -0.0298*
(-1.72) (-1.75)
Structural Controls
    Inflation 0.00306 0.00306 0.00161 0.00310
(0.74) (0.74) (0.39) (0.75)
    TradeOP -0.0255** -0.0246** -0.0257** -0.0255**
(-2.76) (-2.61) (-2.72) (-2.71)
    Schooling -0.000338+ -0.000370 -0.000740+ -0.000583+
(-1.59) (-1.21) (-1.42) (-1.33)
Financial Controls
    Fin. Depth -0.00288+ -0.00326+ -0.00224 -0.00283
(-1.38) (-1.42) (-1.15) (-1.17)
    KAOP*Fin.Depth -0.0148* -0.0182+ -0.0145+ -0.0183+
(-1.74) (-1.37) (-1.38) (-1.40)
Dummies
    Boom -0.0193+
(-1.39)
    Bust 0.0476
(1.26)
DKAOP*Bust (t=-1) -0.0176*
(-1.72)
DKAOP*Bust (t=0) 0.0109+ 0.0089*
(1.56) (1.76)
DKAOP*Bust (t=0; t³1) -0.0202*
(-1.96)
Constant 0.907** 0.903** 0.886** 0.711**
(7.62) (7.58) (7.62) (7.66)
Observations 1664 1664 1664 1664
                   t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
Note: DKAOP*Bust (t=-1) means that DKAOP happened at (t=-1) where (t=0) is the year when 
the bust begins. DKAOP*Bust (t=0) means that DKAOP happened at (t=0) where (t=0) is the 
year when the bust begins. DKAOP*Bust (t=0; t³1) means that DKAOP happened at (t=0) where 
(t=0) is the year when the bust begins and is multiply all the periods the bust lasted.
Table 6 ensembles a set of estimations to study the correlation between capital openness and 
inequality after an unexpected shock. A monetary shock as the one represented by RR has been 
used to proxy markets performance or economic expectations. It also carries an important feature: 
as it is based on U.S. monetary policy, it is linked directly to the financial system, which, as 
previously discussed, is key for distributional effects. We keep in the regression the direct effect 
that KAOP may have on the Gini, but we also interact it with the RR. The main reason to do so is 
that we seek to track the marginal effect of changes in KAOP, that is, 
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                                                                       (7)
The estimations reveal that, when controlling for unexpected shocks, the correlation between 
KAOP and Gini weakens in terms of the magnitude of impact. In the baseline regression (shown 
again in Table 6 column (1)), point estimate was -0.0135. When controlling by our proxies 
for exogenous shocks the point estimates increased their correlation with inequality growth. 
In particular, the R&R estimation resulted in a coefficient of -0.0101, substantially below the 
baseline. This seems to be on the expected track: shocks are detrimental for equity. Only changes 
in policies that shifts negatively the Chinn-Ito Index could change the direction of equation (7). 
Even if the KAOP change is null, the total effect will be an increase of 0.0123 –though only 85% 
of the times. A similar conclusion results from estimation (3) in the same table. The interaction 
effects track about the same significance as (2), but the single effect is now both, detrimental 
and significant at 10%. In summary, unanticipated deviations from growth forecasts may induce 
increases in inequality by nullifying any positive spillover of opening further the capital account. 
In both cases, we did find weak statistical evidence to argue a possible conditional effect , but only 
with p-values between 10% and 5%.
Table 6. Unexpected Shocks (proxies). Fixed-Effects Estimations, Arellano-Bond
(1) (2) (3)
Gini (t-1) 0.768** 0.754** 0.768**
(24.03) (23.57) (23.71)
KAOP -0.0135* -0.0101* -0.0117*
(-1.72) (-1.84) (-1.69)
Structural Controls
       Inflation -0.00306 -0.00277 -0.00321
(-0.74) (-0.68) (-0.77)
       TradeOP -0.0255** -0.0237** -0.0252**
(-2.76) (-2.58) (-2.72)
       Schooling -0.000338+ -0.000262+ -0.000352
(-1.59) (-1.55) (-1.20)
Financial Controls
       Fin. Depth -0.00288+ -0.00289 -0.00376
(-1.38) (-0.38) (-0.48)
       KAOP*Fin.Depth -0.0148* 0.00416 0.00408
(-1.74) (0.41) (0.39)
Shocks
       R&R 0.0123
(1.20)
       KAOP*R&R 0.00521*
(1.91)
       Growth.Forecast 0.00140+
(1.62)
       KAOP*Growth.Forecast 0.0402*
(1.89)
Constant 0.907** 0.958** 0.910**
(7.62) (8.04) (7.52)
Observations 1664 1664 1664
t statistics in parentheses   + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔#,%
𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧#,%
= 𝛾𝛾) + 𝛾𝛾+𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾#,% 
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Overall, the estimations broadly support our hypothesis. First, global exogenous shocks -such as 
the R&R monetary shocks, increase the level of detriment of income distribution. Moreover, the 
size of the shock plays an important role by increasing income inequality through a direct effect 
and as a magnifier through KAOP. The RR shock is linked to how developed the financial system 
is. Therefore, we would expect that its effect on inequality is larger in lower and middle income 
countries compared to high-income. Nonetheless, there was no strong evidence to support this 
assumption. The channel is the precisely the financial system that under these circumstances acts 
as a magnifier or shock. Therefore, opening further the capital account KAOP open will not offer 
the positive returns as it did before. Second, whenever an unusual economic performance is more 
correlated to the global economic cycles, the negative effects on income distribution magnify. 
This is consistent with the boom-busts discussion: capital openness is unambiguously worse 
for income equality during bust. As atypical economic performances depart from global cycles, 
capital account openness correlates negatively with inequality, suggesting also the existence of a 
magnifying effect whenever the global economies are the main cause of an atypical event.
So what lessons can we extract? Much has been discussed about the rationale behind policies that 
restricts capital openness. Controls on capital account transactions represent a country’s attempt to 
shield itself from risks associated with fluctuations in international capital flows. Capital controls 
take on special circumstances, for instance, in the context of a fixed exchange rate regime.  In 
a country with a fragile banking system, for instance, allowing households to in- vest abroad 
freely could precipitate an exodus of domestic savings and jeopardize the banking system’s 
viability. Likewise, short-term capital inflows can be quickly reversed when a country is hit with 
an adverse macroeconomic shock, thereby amplifying its macroeconomic effect. In theory, capital 
account liberalization should allow for more efficient global allocation of capital from capital-rich 
industrial countries to capital-poor developing economies. This should have widespread benefits 
by providing a higher rate of return on people’s savings in industrial countries and by increasing 
growth, employment opportunities, and living standards in developing countries.  Access to 
capital markets should allow countries to “insure” themselves to some extent against fluctuations 
in their national incomes such that national consumption levels are relatively less volatile. Since 
good and bad times often are not synchronized across countries, capital flows can, to some extent, 
offset volatility in countries’ own national incomes.
The evidence, as we have seen, is not quite as compelling as the theory, however. Middle income 
countries that have liberalized their capital accounts typically have had questionable improvement 
on inequality. According to our findings this is associated with swings in the domestic and world 
economy, thereby magnifying the negative effects. Is there actually evidence of the goodness 
of closing the external accounts? Considering the whole panel, we tested if restrictive measures 
on the capital account were significantly followed by periods of lower inequality (Table 5). The 
coefficients broadly keep the same patterns as the baseline regression. However, to support a 
“closing policy” requires more thought. The key element is when the policy is enacted and the 
expected time that it will actually affect the markets. Evidence suggest that policies restraining 
openness at the year of a bust that lasts about a year are practically ineffective to mitigate 
distributional effects. However, these policies might turn the balance in favor if the bust persists. 
The only way to avoid distributional negative effects in busts is to anticipate them, however it 
is usually not easy to do so. Policies therefore must not be passive. If no policy changes occur, 
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unexpected shocks will be detrimental, especially when the financial system is affected. So should 
a country close, open or a mix? It seems that the right direction is to call for an active mechanism 
to respond. Certainly we find evidence on how timing matters, as restricting the account to face a 
shock reduces the negative effects on income distribution when it lasts more than a year. However, 
whether the policies should be focused on those related to the financial account may as well be 
inconclusive since governments usually can expand their social spending during recovery periods 
(assuming there is a certain level of public spending efficiency). Notwithstanding, this result 
opens the door to explore the role of safety nets as co-policy instruments to mitigate the negative 
effects during downturns. 
6    Conclusions
Literature has largely concluded that capital account liberalization may have negative effects on 
growth through financial instability in emerging markets.  Moreover, the links between economic 
and financial distress and income inequality have also been frequently revisited, especially in the 
last decade. In this paper, we attempt to build upon these two literatures to examine the extent to 
which capital account liberalization is associated with income inequality. We conclude that capital 
openness is associated with a decrease in inequality when a country transitions into a higher income 
group, where stronger institutions are usually in place. Our findings offer supportive evidence 
that financial development is key to extend the benefits of the capital account liberalization to all 
income levels. Financial development in the form of access is important as it allows households 
to insure and smooth consumption and income streams. However, we also show evidence that 
unexpected shocks, and especially those affecting the financial channels, make a strong case for 
active policy actions to reduce their detrimental impact on income distribution. 
We expand on these findings to learn that there are differential impacts of capital account 
liberalization on inequality during periods of economic expansion and contraction. The impact of 
financial liberalization on income inequality is positive during normal economic times, whereas 
during contractions, capital account liberalization appears to exacerbate income inequality. Strong 
institutions and financial depth are key factors in determining the extent of the negative impacts. 
One possible reason behind this is that financial services may provide households with better 
risk sharing and the possibility of shielding themselves against economic swings.  Furthermore, 
our findings suggest that when a country decides to implement regulations to slow and steer 
financial flows during atypical economic events, the detrimental effects on income distributions 
diminish. These findings offer supportive ground in favor of counter-cyclical, temporary, and 
flexible ’speed bumps’ during sudden stops or similar atypical events. However, this result might 
also be in favor of not exclusively focusing on capital account measure and instead combine them 
with other social redistributive policies simultaneously.
Finally, it is conceivable that for most developing countries, where institutions are weak, the 
absence of ex-ante policies imply that capital account liberalization will probably increase income 
inequality during periods of economic contraction.  In order to ensure dignifying living conditions, 
it seems relevant to implement additional protection measures for the initially disadvantaged 
groups as seems to be the case in Latin America and the Caribbean. Thus, further work is required 
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to explain whether safety nets (especially conditioned cash transfers) are behind these observed 
differences and if liberalization should be synchronized with social safety net coverage.
The findings discussed in this paper bring to consideration two kinds of policies. On the one 
hand, policies geared to seize the positive spillovers of openness during economic expansion, 
albeit designed such that they can also act as safety nets during contractions. On the other hand, 
our findings support resorting to capital restrictions during busts, especially if social safety nets 
have low coverage or are inexistent.  For most developing countries, where institutions are weak, 
the absence of safety net policies implies that capital account liberalization will likely increase 
income inequality. In order to ensure dignifying living conditions, it seems relevant to implement 
additional protection measures for the initially disadvantaged groups.
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7 Annex
Table A1. Access. Fixed-Effects Estimation, Arellano-Bond
Weak (1) Weak (2) Strong (1) Strong (2)
Gini (t-1) 0.716** 0.716** 0.715** 0.658**
(43.93) (43.92) (17.92) (15.53)
KAOP -0.0155* -0.0204* -0.0163 -0.0184**
(-2.10) (-2.54) (-1.42) (-4.15)
Structural Controls
     Inflation 0.000221 0.000232 0.000231 0.000105
(1.11) (1.16) (0.48) (-0.21)
     TradeOP -0.0612** -0.0614** -0.0145+ -0.0204+
(-11.19) (-11.22) (-1.264) (-1.72)
     Schooling -0.000260** -0.000259** -0.000110** -0.000153**
(-2.82) (-2.80) (-2.54) (-2.75)
Financial Controls
     LendRate -0.00142 -0.00149 -0.000314+ -0.00386**
(-0.42) (-0.36) (-1.56) (-3.29)
     KAOP*LendRate -0.000216+ -0.00653**
(-1.47) (-4.06)
Constant 1.131** 1.131** 1.053** 1.217**
(17.92) (17.90) (7.50) (8.31)
Observations 921 921 492 492
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.15, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
Table A2. Low-Income Countries. Fixed-Effects Estimation, Arellano-Bond
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gini (t-1) 0.951** 1.041** 1.011** 0.973** 0.987** 0.989**
(55.16) (55.95) (51.27) (38.32) (36.66) (36.15)
KAOP -0.0312** -0.0572** -0.0179* -0.0331 -0.0182 0.0115
(-4.06) (-6.58) (-1.95) (-1.49) (-1.37) (0.37)
Structural Controls
     Inflation -0.000209* -0.000109 -0.000209 -0.000289* -0.000282*
(-2.43) (-1.04) (-1.42) (-2.06) (-2.00)
     TradeOP -0.00105** -0.000719** -0.000597** -0.000565**
(-13.68) (-8.84) (-7.22) (-6.45)
     Schooling 0.000281* 0.000269* 0.000218+
(2.14) (1.97) (1.54)
Financial Controls
     Fin.Depth -0.00366 0.000337
(-1.31) (0.07)
     KAOP*Fin.Depth -0.0119
(-1.07)
Constant 0.195** -0.134+ 0.0386 0.152+ 0.0947 0.0786
(2.99) (-1.91) (0.51) (1.56) (0.91) (0.73)
Observations 790 705 682 422 403 403
t statistics in parentheses   + p < 0.15, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
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Figure 2: Relationship between de jure and de facto measures
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Countries in the Sample
Table 8 shows all countries by income groups. Note that some countries (such as Chile) appear in 
two more groups. This is because the income criteria that we used (Section 3) allow for countries 
to transition between income groups. 
Table A3: Income Gr
High Income Middle Income Low Income 
Australia Albania Mongolia Afghanistan Nepal 
Austria Algeria Morocco Albania Nicaragua 
Belgium Armenia Namibia Armenia Niger 
Canada Azerbaijan Nigeria Azerbaijan Nigeria 
Chile Barbados Panama Bangladesh Pakistan 
Croatia Belarus Paraguay Benin Papua New Guinea 
Cyprus Belize Peru Bhutan Philippines 
Czech Republic Bhutan Philippines Bolivia Rwanda 
Denmark Bolivia Poland Bosnia and Herzegovina Senegal 
Estonia Bosnia and Herzegovina Russia Burkina Faso Sierra Leone 
Finland Botswana Seychelles Burundi Sri Lanka 
France Brazil Slovakia Cambodia Tajikistan 
Germany Bulgaria Slovenia Cameroon Tanzania 
Greece Chile South Africa Central African Republic Togo 
Hong Kong China Sri Lanka Chad Turkmenistan 
Hungary Colombia St. Lucia China Uganda 
Iceland Costa Rica Suriname Comoros Ukraine 
Ireland Croatia Swaziland Cote d'Ivoire Uzbekistan 
Israel Czech Republic Thailand Djibouti Vietnam 
Italy Dominican Republic Trinidad and Tobago El Salvador Zambia 
Japan Ecuador Tunisia Ethiopia Zimbabwe 
Kazakhstan El Salvador Turkey Gambia  
Latvia Estonia Turkmenistan Georgia  
Lithuania Fiji Ukraine Ghana  
Malaysia Georgia Uruguay Guinea  
Malta Guatemala Venezuela Guinea-Bissau  
Netherlands Hungary   Guyana  
New Zealand Indonesia   Haiti  
Norway Iran   Honduras  
Poland Israel   India  
Portugal Jamaica   Indonesia  
Russia Jordan   Kenya  
Seychelles Kazakhstan   Kyrgyz Republic  
Singapore Latvia   Lesotho  
Slovak Republic Lebanon   Madagascar  
Slovenia Lithuania   Malawi  
Spain Macedonia   Mali  
Sweden Malaysia   Mauritania  
Switzerland Maldives   Moldova  
Trinidad and 
Tobago Mauritius   Mongolia  
United Kingdom Mexico   Morocco  
United States Moldova   Mozambique  
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